Abstract

There is a lack of research solely on the views of residents that have experienced flooding, and this project aims to explore these views. Flooded residents in this case believe policy makers are responsible for flooding in their area. This project highlights that flooded residents expect more to be done to protect them, and to alleviate their fears of future flooding. There is evidence to suggest that the relationship between flooded residents and policy makers is troubled, mainly due to residents views that policy makers do not sufficiently take into account their views and understandings of the local area. The results suggest policy makers need to do more, or try new strategies to improve the relationship, whilst residents need to understand the risk of living on a floodplain and to not expect complete protection. The project highlights residents do have knowledge of their area and of what they think will work to aid flood relief which leads to suggestions that policy makers relying on traditional ‘hard’ approaches should still consider ‘soft’ methods such a dredging.

Introduction

            Nature operates in its own way, and flooding is a good example of this. Rivers have their own natural watercourses and floodplains, which may change or behave differently depending on the factors that influence them, such as rainfall and ground type. Humans, however, are increasingly building urban landscapes on natural floodplains of rivers that have a tendency to flood. It is therefore inevitable that humans and their properties are affected by floods. The extremity of the flood and the measures in place to alleviate flooding determine how badly humans and their properties are affected. This is very much the case for the areas of Wraysbury and Datchet which are situated alongside the River Thames in South-West England (map in appendix). There has been a history of flooding in these areas, and other surrounding areas along the Thames. There are flood defence measures in place to protect areas further upstream of Datchet and Wraysbury. However, there has been some debate as to whether the measures implemented upstream have in fact increased the risk of flooding downstream. Much of these views have come from residents downstream, who have been flooded recently.

The areas of Datchet and Wraysbury have been chosen on the basis that there has previously been flooding in these areas, such as during January 2003. It is central to the research that the majority of residents had experienced flooding, as it is significant to establish how these residents respond to these situations, and respond to how flood alleviation is managed in their area.

Therefore, the main aims of the research are to:

• Establish in detail how affected residents feel about flooding events in their area.
• How they were involved, if at all, in the decision making process for flood alleviation in their area.
• How they feel about the measures in place to alleviate flooding; including what they expect in the future.
• Then from this, try to establish how policy makers could respond to peoples view and concerns.

If these aims are achieved, there should be clear benefits. Hopefully there will be some trends in the views of residents that will help policy makers further understand how these residents feel, so that for future projects this can be implemented into the research.

Literature Review

Flooding is an issue that is apparent all over the world, and a lot of the time a hazard that cannot be avoided. Heavy rainfalls in many countries around the world in recent years have shown that occasional flooding cannot always be prevented (e.g. Elbe, Germany 2002; Jakarta, Indonesia 2002; Yangtze, China 1998). Moreover, the frequency of flood events is likely to increase in the future due to expected climate change, sea level rise, deforestation, and ongoing urbanization (Hoes et al, 2005). The effect of flooding varies based on the fact that certain communities of populations are often situated in more perilous settings than others due to the consequences of political, economic and social forces (Bankof, 2003). Political forces include where new housing is built, which may create a flood risk for more people. In economic terms, those unable to move from an area at risk from flooding due to financial reasons have a more perilous setting than those who have financial flexibility. And finally constructions of society may lead certain population groups to live in areas at greater flood risk. Cannon (1994) explains further this idea of living in a more perilous setting, arguing that while hazards are natural, disasters are not. Social systems generate unequal exposure to risk by making some people more prone to disaster than others with these inequalities in risk and opportunity largely a function of the power relations operating in every society. It maybe be fair to deduce that in some circumstances, especially where expenditure of policy makers is limited, one flood risk area may be selected for flood alleviation over another largely based on the power relations and social systems which are in place.

The issue of urbanisation and floodplain development mean there are a great number of people at risk from flooding. Rivers that flow through urban areas encounter society-made factors, such as bridges and general debris, which inhibit the effective flow of water and can cause levels to rise in the areas they would cause most damage (Montz, 2000). The higher density of people as a result of development leads to a response by policy makers to attempt to manage rivers and reduce flooding for the benefit of certain areas. Engineers involved in such projects normally favour large scale structural/engineering devices. Often these approaches are criticised. Many river courses have been altered and straightened to aid transportation and urban development. This transports water downstream at a higher speed, decreasing the period between rainfall and a flooding event, therefore restricting the time available to issue effective flood warnings (Howe and White, 2002).

Rashed Chowdhury (2003) suggests residents believe there are inappropriate structural controls when social, cultural and political solutions are required. However, it is not only the structural flood defence system but policies as a whole that are often under scrutiny. Chowdhury also suggests that public policy so far has failed to realize the behavioural attitudes of the people subjected to a wide variety of hazards. Further, the lack of coordination between the physical, environmental, societal and technological system in the hazard zones, and the adoption of public actions without any regard for the attitude, perception and behaviour of the people are among the important factors responsible for the failure of public policy. What is important to note is that in terms of flood alleviation, it is based largely on opinion whether a policy is a success or failure when looking from a residents’ point of view.

It is also important to understand that individual rivers are fed by their catchment areas, thus any action relating to defence and prevention needs to be on a catchment wide scale. However, planning authorities rarely cover an entire river drainage basin. Furthermore, the cost of maintaining flood defences over the long term has to be taken into consideration, and raises the question of who is responsible (Howe and White, 2002).

There are, however, many ways of overcoming problems in flood alleviation policies. For example in the UK, floodplain management has tended to focus on a technical-engineering approach characterised by the construction of physical barriers to control and limit flood damage (Fordham, 2000). What is lacking is a properly integrated and coherent approach at all levels, which should be addressed in the policy to achieve best results. This means creating a policy that takes into account knowledge across many disciplines, such as engineering, social studies, and so on. It has been suggested that public involvement in projects will improve the final product. In the western democratic tradition, public participation in decision-making processes is considered as cornerstone of environmental management (Dearden and Mitchell, 1998). This idea of public participation is important, and potentially so is the idea of ‘oral history’. This is the knowledge possessed by residents of the area that can help policy makers ascertain a greater understanding of both physical and social processes in the area. After a study in Australia, Robertson and McGee (2003) claim oral history proved effective in enabling the values and concerns of local community and stakeholders to be articulated, increasing managers’ understanding of the social context of the particular locality which is fundamental to sound environmental decision-making. The importance of public participation and oral history not only lies with greater understanding of residents views and their knowledge of the history of the area, but also to help facilitate early conflict resolution between stakeholders and the community. Generally, it is accepted that public participation facilitates increased democracy, which empowers local communities and thus increases the likelihood of management actions being supported (Kapoor, 2001; Shindler and Cheek, 1999). Of course, oral history and resident views cannot always be correct, and it has been criticized for not being scientifically credible (e.g. Finlayson and Brizga, 1995). However, cross-referencing information wherever possible can verify oral history responses with other sources of information, meaning inaccurate reports can be identified. Therefore policy makers cannot rely too heavily on public participation and oral history, but used in parts with other information it can provide a very useful tool for creating good public policy.

One of the major problems policy makers have to deal with is that the public may often expect complete protection. The capacity of public authorities to cope with flood events (which in the future may well be aggravated by climate change) is subject to severe limitations, both in financial and organizational terms. Therefore, public authorities will have to communicate clearly, that public flood protection – permanent levies or impermanent protective water barriers – does not provide total security (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). Most residents living in a flood risk area do accept there is some risk, but the way they perceive this risk depends on certain factors. Homeowners are likely to be more fearful of floods than renters, and are more likely to perceive the risks from flooding as greater (Takao et al, 2004). Similarly, those that have had a recent experience with flooding tends to increase their perceived risk associated with flooding (Bin and Polasky, 2003). This is important as perception of risk will deduce how prepared residents are for flooding. For many years it has been widely observed that people living in areas prone to natural hazards often fail to act, or do very little, to lessen their risk of death, injury, or property damage (Kunreuther, 1978; Peek and Mileti, 2002). It is fair to say that although in most cases the local or national authorities are responsible for flood alleviation measures, the fact they can never provide complete protection means a certain amount of responsibility arguably lies with residents themselves. This creates ideas such as ‘private precautionary adaptation’ – installation of protective water barriers, structural changes to the home, or rearranging furniture. This can have a significant effect on flood damages (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). If residents understand the risks, and are properly warned of danger (by a suitable warning system) they themselves can potentially reduce the extent to which they are affected.

The immediate impacts of flooding are clear too see: flooded houses and roads, erosion, and general destruction. After residents and councils have overcome these impacts, there are further secondary problems caused by such incidents. For example, insurance may cost considerably more (Crichton, 2001). The association of British Insurers has previously announced that ‘unless tighter planning guidelines are introduced, the flood insurance guarantee, which certifies that flood insurance is available for all domestic properties, will cease at the end of 2002’. Added to the fact results indicate that a house located within a floodplain has a lower market value than an equivalent house located outside the floodplain (Bin and Polasky, 2003), it is important the flood alleviation policy makers, and local authorities are still involved with residents after the flood. This would help alleviate residents concerns about future floods.

To look more specifically at the UK and lead on to introduce my choice of case study it is first useful to understand that flooding is a very serious issue in the UK, with £150m spent per year on flood relief (Environment Agency). It has been acknowledged for some time that flooding is one of the UK’s most damaging and potentially expensive natural hazards (Thomalla, 2001). In England specifically, 8% of the land area is at risk from flooding (National Audit Office, 2001). This information, coupled with the cluster of extreme floods in England and Wales over the 1998–2000 period (e.g. in April, October, December 1998 and November 2000) and their wide-scale human impact, has heightened the need for research that informs organizational and individual policy to reduce flood losses.

The lower Thames region is an area that has seen small regular flooding as well as some very large damaging floods. The area of Maidenhead has been submerged regularly, so much so the Environment Agency (refereed to as EA from here onwards); who are in control of flooding issues in the UK (among other environmental issues) created a scheme to reduce flooding which was implemented in 2002. The whole project went through a public enquiry in 1992 involving areas directly involved, plus those downstream (including Datchet and Wraysbury). The project was given the go-ahead. Known as the Eton, Windsor and Maidenhead flood alleviation project, it was designed to reduce flooding with the main feature an 11.6km flood relief channel called the Jubilee River (diagram in appendix). This would run alongside the Thames and take flood waters when necessary to reduce the water level in the Thames. The amount of water let in under such flood circumstances would be decided by operators controlling the relevant sluices. The first real test for the Jubilee River was heavy rainfall in December 2002. Maidenhead was not flooded, a success for the EA, although further downstream Datchet and Wraysbury were in early January 2003. Some residents have since been blaming the EA and their Jubilee River. For example, on the 17^th May 2004, a press release issued on behalf of community groups downstream of the Jubilee River claimed ‘the conclusion drawn from the preceding facts and published data can only be that mismanagement and misopertation of the river by the EA played a significant role in the severity of flooding downstream of the Jubilee River’ (Thames Web). This project will focus on why residents feel the EA is at fault, and what they think should be done about it.

The focus of this project on the areas of Datchet and Wraysbury is based on the fact there is evidence (mainly on the internet) to suggest that residents feel strongly about flooding issues in their region. It was essential to establish exactly how residents consider the situation to understand what residents expect from flood relief, their preferred measures of defence, and their expectations on how they feel policy makers should treat residents. There is a rich history of flooding in the three areas. In 1947, a large flood had a huge impact in the area. Regular flooding since then has caused smaller problems until the severe case in early January 2003. The implementation of the Jubilee River in 2002, followed by the floods in January 2003 may be a coincidence, but residents actively believe it to be more than this. Added to the fact the 1992 Public Enquiry quotes ‘persistent concern has been expressed that the scheme would exacerbate flooding downstream. Investigators however show that there would be no worsening of flooding in Datchet and no significant change in peak flows or levels downstream of the FRC [Flood Relief Channel]’, it is understandable why residents feel the EA are to blame.

Research Topics

Research Topic 1: Public Involvement

This topic will include how residents were involved in public policy for flood alleviation, such as to what extent they were consulted prior to any projects being implemented plus reasons for this. Also how they felt their views were taken into account. The publics’ involvement after flooding will also be discussed, drawing on what has happened since the January 2003 floods.

Research Topic 2: Residents views on flood causes

Look at residents views on who they believe is responsible for flooding and why, with reference to the Jubilee River. Also consider the EA’s reasons for flooding and their views on the use of the Jubilee River.

Research Topic 3: Expectations for flood control

Understand residents preferred choices for flood alleviation measures, and favoured ways they believe the EA should operate flood control policy now and in the future.

Research Topic 4: General Views

Present any interesting views of residents that may not be specific to the topics above but relevant for the project as a whole, for example concerns over house prices and insurance. This may highlight some ideas or concerns of residents that could potentially be investigated further in another project.

Methodology

            This project has been designed to understand flooded residents, and it is largely based on opinion and ideas. It does not aim to suggest any one truth but to produce suggestions and ideas. Therefore the project has been influenced by a postmodern approach, seeking to create interpretations and relations rather than producing ‘one truth’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000).

The research will be mainly qualitative. In order to compile enough information to present a case of residents’ views, a multi-method research design would be used, with an initial questionnaire distributed to residents, followed by in-depth interviews with residents and the EA, subject to arrangement. This is a good approach as it would cover many issues as well as being able to get in-depth answers. In addition Olsson and Folke (2001) found that supplementing questionnaires with interviews allowed them to establish detailed information from residents by means of their study at Lake Racken in Sweden, and similar approach would be likely to benefit this project. Based on the ideas from the literature review, it was imperative that the residents were from areas that had experienced flooding. To ensure this was the case, various website archives were searched dating back to the January 2003 floods to find roads in the chosen areas that had been affected. This produced a list of roads in each area, shown below (Figure 1):

Figure 1:

Profile of Areas:

Wraysbury and Datchet are in the Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead. They have populations of 3,642 and 4,647 respectively. The average house price over the two areas is £350,590 with 73% owner occupied for the whole borough. Over 90% of the population is of white origin. The areas show high education rates and consist of middle-upper class residents (Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead).

Questionnaire Design:

The Questionnaire needed to confirm the residents had in fact been flooded. Establishing whether residents felt at risk from flooding would be interesting. Based on the views expressed by residents on the internet, a question was designed to investigate whether people thought the Jubilee River had created a greater risk of flooding. The idea of public participation touched upon in the literature review meant a question about correspondence with the EA was included. The questionnaire also needed to establish how people felt about the policy used by the EA to reduce flooding, and their expectations of what will happen in the future. Including an ‘other information’ space at the end meant residents might be encouraged to present more views. Information from Foddy (1993) was used to gain background ideas for constructing questionnaires; notably for decisions between open and closed questions. Pages in the appendix exhibit completed copies of the questionnaire.

            The questionnaire is different to many standard questionnaires in that it has very few introductory questions about demographic information, such as sex, age, religion and job type. This is because there needed to be a clear focus on residents views and ideas, based only on the fact they have experienced flooding (and are at risk from flooding) in their area. This will hopefully create clear trends that policy makers could apply to the majority of flood schemes to deal with affected residents views and concerns. Trying to consider views based on sex or job type may have complicated the aim of establishing trends for flooded residents as a whole. There is also the added factor of ‘research bias’. This is the idea that potential results may create generalisations towards certain sectors of the population based on how they feel about flooding issues and policy makers.

The end of the questionnaire suggested my details may be passed on to people who did not receive a questionnaire but may be interested in answering some questions. This was carried out to create some interest from people that may be largely involved in the community or have information about flooding they think may be relevant to the project. The distribution of the questionnaire was random (as discussed further on) and therefore any extra responses (which would be via email) would not be included in the normal questionnaire responses but treated as extra information.

            Accompanying the questionnaire was a cover letter. This was designed to inform residents of the reasons for the project, some background information about myself, and how residents could provide information for the study by answering the questionnaire. This was intended to increase the chances of a good response rate.

Questionnaire Distribution:

The questionnaires will be distributed randomly to the roads listed previously. To ensure random allocation, every house on all the roads was the sample size. So for Wraysbury, the total number of houses in each road selection was: Gloucester Drive (51), Ouseley Road (82), Riverside (24), Wharf Road (39) and Friary Island (5). Starting from house number 1 on Gloucester Drive and numbering continually through the roads (so number 1 at Ouseley Road would be number 52) there were 201 houses in the sample. The same was done for Datchet where there were 182 houses in the sample. Costs for creating and distributing the questionnaire meant there would be a total of 200 delivered; therefore it was decided 105 in Wraysbury and 95 in Datchet; which is in proportion to the sample populations. To decide which houses the questionnaire would get delivered to, a random number generator was used (Daniels, M). A response rate of 40% was intended. The questionnaire was delivered in person in a large envelope which contained the questionnaire, the cover letter, and a smaller stamped addressed envelope with my address. Again this was done to offer people the easiest possible method of reply, as they would not need to provide their own envelope or stamp.

Interviews:

In order to follow up the questionnaire with some more specific detailed information, interviews with residents would be conducted. Bunting and Guelke (1979) suggest there are strong grounds for questioning whether it is possible to extract an individual’s actual thoughts (e.g., his or her ‘real’ perception of flood risk) from answers to standardized questions. The interviews will aim to extract these thoughts and ideas. An ‘interview guide approach’ will be used (Patton, 1990), where there are set structured questions but possibilities of being more diverse. This covers the main topics as well as providing a more ‘free-form’ approach to obtain further information. The people involved in these interviews were those who had offered to answer more questions in the ‘other information’ section of the questionnaire. After contacting different people, there were several opportunities in place and a total of six residents were interviewed. The interviews were designed around the responses from questionnaires, and were set in the interviewees’ houses to ensure they felt comfortable. It also allowed the resident to indicate where they were flooded, where the water came from, and so on. The interviews were approached with prior knowledge from the questionnaires and reading. Therefore providing some understanding of residents concerns which allowed

a more open perspective on the issues to be taken. The appendix shows a page of transcribed interview, as well as profiles of the six interviewed residents and comments on situational contexts, as discussed by Kitchin and Tate (2000).

Methodology Limitations

It is important to remember that ‘qualitative data analysis is largely an inductive open ended process’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995) and it therefore has the potential for both interesting and useful analysis as well as more mundane observations. This will depend on the interpretation of the researcher, and so there is potential for over emphasising some information, or wrongfully discounting others. There are several approaches to understanding qualitative data which could lead to variable results.

            The questionnaires were aimed at finding and understanding peoples’ opinions in the area. Due to the questionnaire design, it is likely those with the strongest opinions would fill in the questionnaire, but those feeling less strongly may have felt less incentive to do so. The questionnaire data will still reflect the trends in the sample population but there will be some over estimation of the strength of the trends. Similarly, the residents that offered to do interviews were those that actively wanted to share their opinion. It is therefore that case that they may have stronger views than the average resident in the area.

For interviewing, there is always the potential for ‘interviewer influence’ whereby the answers given by interviewees are influenced by the interviewers’ questions. The interviews aimed to avoid this, but in certain situations this could inevitably still occur.

Results

The research topics stated earlier will be investigated in detail in this section. I will present each topic separately, and show relevant results from the questionnaires and interviews, display using suitable methods, and then discuss the findings throughout. This will be followed by a general discussion of the results as a whole, and suggestions for possible future studies. A general data table is included in the appendix.

Research Topic 1: Public Involvement

            As discussed in the literature review, any successful policy needs an element of public participation to involve the ideas and concerns of the relevant residents and their representative organisations. The Environment Agency (then the National Rivers Authority) held a public enquiry in 1992 to consider all aspects of the flood relief scheme that was eventually completed in 2002.

            The enquiry allowed councils and organisations to voice their concerns over the scheme, and have their questions answered by those involved in the decision making process. For Example, The Datchet Parish Council voiced concerns over several issues related to the scheme, such as the effect the scheme would have on property values and insurance costs, the concern over the high cost of the scheme when cheaper alternatives would be better, and of course the possibility of adverse effects downstream (full list appendix). Similarly, many local planning authorities had no objections to the scheme, such as Berkshire County Council, Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, and Slough Borough Council. These are regions that are located around the development area of the scheme, some of which were included in the areas to benefit from the scheme. What is important to remember is Datchet and Wraysbury were not districts that were intended to see major benefits from the scheme, but due to residents concerns over the design of the scheme were included in the public enquiry. This follows the statement made in the enquiry that ‘consultation meetings and presentations were held with a large range of organisations and local groups’. Therefore, according to the enquiry, there was a substantial amount of public involvement during the scheme design.

According the questionnaire responses, there was some contact between the EA and the public. Residents were asked ‘did you have any correspondence with the EA prior to or since the Jubilee River (2002) was implemented? How useful was it?’ A tick box option was presented to them, as displayed by the sample questionnaire in the appendix. Prior to 2002, before the Jubilee River was implemented, 43 people responded that there was no contact from the EA, 26 people that there was some contact (38%), and no residents selected the ‘a lot’ of contact option. Of the 26 people that did have contact, 14 found it useful (‘ok’), and 12 ‘not useful’. Of all 69 people that answered this question, only 20.3% (14 people) had any useful contact with the EA. Since 2002, there were some improvements with 72 people in total answering the question, of which 44 of those did have some contact with the EA, a rise from 38% prior to 2002, to 61.1% since. However, out of the 72 people, only 23.6% (17 people) had any useful contact; only a slight increase from prior to 2002. The summary charts are shown below (Figures 2 and 3):

What this seems to suggest is that the EA did make some attempts to contact residents before the implementation of the Jubilee River, and that this was increased after the flooding in January 2003. Unfortunately residents did not seem to find much use in any contact that ensued, with one residents suggesting it was “well intentioned but unconvincing”. There were some positive suggestions from residents, with one saying the use was “mainly Floodline information which is a good service”. Overall it appears there have been decent efforts by the EA to contact residents but they have largely been unsuccessful to either provide information about flooding and alleviation measures, or to understand residents concerns.

The Floodline and EA internet flood warning system were mentioned by several of the interviewees, with mixed suggestions that Floodline is confusing as well as useful, and that the internet based warning system has previously failed/collapsed or overloaded. This runs with the questionnaire responses that there is a certain amount of effort by the EA to provide contact facilities, but that they have not been wholly useful. There were also open meetings following the January 2003 floods to discuss matters with residents, one of which attending such meeting in Egham; one of the nearby areas impacted by the floods. However he “felt sorry for the EA guy at Egham who had to deal with peoples concerns…he simply didn’t know his stuff”, and that he was “just quoting statistics”. This again suggests the efforts by the EA are prevalent to some degree, but that they have been far from successful in bridging the gap between flooded residents and policy makers. It would suggest that the EA need a different approach to alleviate residents concerns and understand their preferences for flood alleviation in their area. Whether or not residents are over fussy in their expectations of the EA’s efforts, there is not enough evidence here to suggest that the EA have made sufficient effort to communicate with residents, despite suggestions that this is essential for public policy (Dearden and Mitchell, 1998). The fact not one resident or interviewee suggest their correspondence with the EA has been ‘very useful’ indicates that the residents are some way from being happy with the EA’s efforts in dealing with residents views and concerns. The public involvement is definitely there, but not to a standard of which residents are satisfied with, and is therefore a conflict point between the EA and the residents in Datchet and Wraysbury. It is suggested that good public involvement can reduce the conflict between policy makers and Residents (Kapoor, 2001; Shindler and Cheek, 1999).

Research Topic 2: Residents Views on Flood Causes

At the time of the January 2003 floods, the EA said ‘It [the Jubilee River] did its job very well and prevented the flooding of up to 600 homes’, adding ‘It is unfortunate for the Jubilee River that the rainfall in January this year was exceptional…The flooding downstream would have happened regardless’ (Payne, 2003). This is what the EA feel about the flooding that has occurred in Datchet and Wraysbury. However, In order to established what residents felt about the flooding in their area, and what they felt about the efforts of the EA to alleviate flooding, much of the questionnaire and interview topics were geared towards investigating this. There was particular focus on the impacts of the Jubilee River and its operation, with this being discussed in detail throughout the interviews. As this was the major feature of the flood alleviation measures put in place by the EA, the discussion surrounding it is likely to be very differing in opinion.

Questionnaire responses:

            In response to question 4 ‘The Jubilee River was completed in 2002 to aid flood prevention. Do you feel there is less or more of a risk based on your experiences since then?’ there were clear trends: The average score over all the questionnaire responses was 4.26 which is in between ‘more risk’ (score 4) and ‘much more risk’ (score 5). With score 5 being the maximum, this is highly indicative of the views of the residents. The fact only 8 people gave a score of 3 or below (no change, less risk, or much less risk) out of 88 questionnaire responses (of which only 2 declined to answer the question) shows a powerful trend of the residents views. There is no doubt the feeling of the residents in Datchet and Wraysbury is that there is now a significantly higher risk of flooding than before the Jubilee River was implemented. The chart below (Figure 4) shows the amount of responses for each scoring for question 4, clearly indicating the bulk of responses being 4 or 5:

Looking at Datchet and Wraysbury separately illustrates no difference in this trend. Residents scored this question 4.31 and 4.33 respectively (these scores are above the overall average due to some higher scores given by residents who declined to give their location so could not be assigned to Datchet or Wraysbury, but were included in the overall average). What is important to note is that these two areas score very similarly for this question, despite residents indicating they are affected by flooding differently. Question 1 of the questionnaire was ‘to what degree have you been flooded since living here?’ and question 2 was ‘to what degree do you feel there is a risk of flooding in your area?’. The responses given between the areas were fairly different, as shown by the chart below (Figure 5):

Residents of Wraysbury perceive that they have been affected by flooding to a greater degree than residents of Datchet, and they perceive the risk to be greater. This means both areas strongly feel the EA has significantly increased the risk of flooding, even though they have experienced flooding and perceive the risks in slightly different ways. The Jubilee River was first used during the January 2003 floods, and it is residents’ bad experiences from this that have caused them to feel negatively about the Jubilee River. They clearly feel the Jubilee River and its operation caused flooding in 2003, and that as the EA implemented this scheme; they are at least partly responsible for these floods.

Interviews:

To really show how much truth there is to the idea residents blame the EA and their Jubilee River for flooding, the in-depth interviews were largely based on this. Residents views ranged from “I didn’t think the rain in the months before January 2003 was as heavy as we have had previously”…“when they spoke about this wet winter, it didn’t strike me as being a feasible answer”- insinuating the flood was not natural to: “The whole thing [the Jubilee River] is substandard from one end to other”. “I have utmost contempt for experts involved in it”. There was a definite impression that the flood was ‘man-made’ as a result of the Jubilee River and the EA’s operation of it. There were also significant remarks about the response from the EA when the matter was brought up. A resident says the EA claimed it was “Just one of those years”…“But they would say that wouldn’t they? Because it’s a huge blunder on their part”. Furthermore, when the EA claimed it was ‘just one of those years’ a resident thought “it was quite insulting to anybody with any intelligence whatsoever, because you knew by your own eyes it simply wasn’t natural”. What this adds up to is that residents believed the EA were at fault, and were so convinced they were shocked that the EA could not understand or accept their opinions. The problem here is that these residents are unlikely to be able prove what they believe happened. They do not have the relevant data, or the means to properly investigate. However, they claim “There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever it was Jubilee River...from 30 to 40 years of experience”, and it is this experience which gives the statements of residents their credibility. The idea of ‘oral history’ (Kapoor, 2001; Shindler and Cheek, 1999) is an idea that has its benefits to policy as well as its drawbacks. However, many residents do have extensive knowledge of flooding in their area and rightly expect their views and understandings to be considered. This lack of appreciation by the EA is what motivates many residents to continue to put pressure on the EA to attempt to find what they deem as ‘hidden truth’ behind the flooding.

Residents were also concerned that the EA had shifted the problem down from Maidenhead: “Datchet and Wraysbury are not densely populated compared to Maidenhead therefore were allowed to flood instead of those areas. I admit there is no evidence of this but it’s the view of many of the public. High profile houses were being flooded in Maidenhead therefore the EA moved the problem downstream”. This follows Terry Canons (1994) view that some residents are in more perilous settings than others based on key social relations. The claims that Datchet and Wraysbury have been sacrificed to defend ‘high profile houses’ in Maidenhead can be linked to genuine theories, but are far from being proven as truth. However, this type of claim typifies residents’ feelings towards the EA and indicates the extent to which they feel the EA and the Jubilee River are at fault. (See appendix for more opinions)

What is also important is that while conducting the interviews, most residents became quite passionate and intense when talking about the reasons behind the flooding in January 2003. It left no doubt in my mind that they truly believed their views are correct. However, it is necessary to look at the bigger picture as well as the views of residents. If we refer to the 1992 public enquiry which explained the intentions of the flood alleviation scheme, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that an extensive amount of time and knowledge was put into the scheme.

The EA, then known as the National Rivers Authority say ‘very extensive and rigorous consideration has been given to the identification of an appropriate scheme to provide alleviation against the risks of flooding in the area’. ‘This began in 1947 immediately after the March 1947 flood; consideration was given to measures which could be adopted to prevent a recurrence’ (page 8, Public Enquiry 1992). This was followed by detailed studies in the 1980’s which produced four basic methods of flood prevention to be considered, where they were ‘determined to obtain the best advice and analysis available’. These were:

1)      Main River Thames enlargement

2)      Bank raising

3)      Flood relief or by-pass channels

4)      Flood Storage

In total the NRA say ‘some 492 options were considered’, that ‘evidence shows the NRA exhaustively examined alternative options. After such a painstaking approach to the selection of the scheme, it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any real alternative, and none has been established at the enquiry’. The issue of downstream flooding was dealt with by the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead (RBWM); ‘in response to public concern, the RBWM commissioned Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners to asses downstream flooding…The resulting assessment strongly endorses the NRA’s conclusions’, which led the RBWM to withdraw their reservations about downstream flooding. This is very significant as Datchet and Wraysbury are both in the RBWM; which did eventually support the scheme. There is a large amount of evidence suggesting that the scheme had the necessary consideration prior to implementation- essential for successful flood alleviation policy (Fordham 2000), and that it had the necessary support from local boroughs, councils and organisations. Overall, residents do place significant blame on the EA and the Jubilee River for the flooding they have experienced, despite the fact the EA believe the flooding would have occurred anyway.

Research Topic 3: Expectations for flood control

Question five of the questionnaire asked residents to rate the overall performance of the EA for flood prevention based on the experiences in their area out of a score of 10. The results indicated residents were very disappointed with the efforts of the EA. Over the 83 people who answered this question (5 people scored 0: no view), the average score for this question was 2.66/10; a significantly low number. The chart (Figure 6) below summarise the spread of the scores:

Of the 83 people who gave a score between one and ten, 77.1% (64 responses) scored the EA’s performance being less than five out of ten, and 36.1% of residents (30 responses) gave the EA the lowest possible score of 1. What this all amounts to is that there is much scepticism by residents in this sample of the EA’s policy on flood prevention in their area.

The ‘other information’ section of the questionnaire was filled in by many residents, the majority of which had something negative to say about the EA, as well as suggestions of what could be done about flooding in the area. The lack of dredging the Thames was one theme throughout, with suggestions that “the river is silting up since dredging finished several years ago” and that “if the Thames was dredged it seems to me quite obvious that this would help alleviate flooding”. Here the residents express knowledge of potential ways to alleviate flooding. An interview also showed this, when a resident commented that “dredging is not the complete answer, but it might make a difference between being badly flooded or not”. Residence also expressed their understanding that the EA do not have the resources to dredge, but could at least “have rented dredgers or contracted it out”. Only the EA can explain why dredging does not occur and whether there would be any real benefit or not, but residents have clearly thought about ways to reduce flooding in the area and there is a degree of expectation for this to happen.

The interviews also produced some more expectations that residents have, as well as their views on how the EA has dealt with the situation so far. Interviewees suggested that “just saying it was one of those unlucky years leaves people in more fear that no action is being taken to stop this happening again. If they admit they did mismanage and say it won’t happen again, it will alleviate peoples’ fears”. Whether the EA did mismanage or not, residents are concerned that there has not been enough action since the events in January 2003 to quash peoples’ fears. Evidence here has shown that residents do understand flooding in their areas, and do expect the EA to implement temporary measures (such a dredging) to alleviate peoples’ worries.

Also at the time of the final interview, the EA released some information on the proposed flood channels (appendix page S) to be introduced into nearby areas to help alleviate flooding. However, the only resident that this was discussed with immediately suggested “it’s a PR stunt to show they [the EA] are trying to do something and to keep people quite” and that he doesn’t think that the project will ever happen. Whether this turns out to be the case or not, it indicates that either the residents are not prepared to be fooled by the EA using ‘smoke and mirror’ policy, or that their negative view of the EA is badly misplaced. Residents in these flooded areas clearly believe that the EA are ultimately not acting in their best interests, or doing many things to alleviate flooding to an acceptable standard.

Research Topic 4: General Views

            The ‘other information’ section of the questionnaire and the in-depth interviews did fabricate some other information that is worthy of discussion. Concern over rising insurance costs was one such topic: “Our house insurance has shot up...they [the insurance companies] look at the address; TW19…they got us all in the same category and put as all at flood risk but its only a small proportion of people that get flooded”, and residents suggested they were “on a blacklist” of non-insurable areas. As well as higher insurance quotes, residents believed their house values have decreased. These examples of knock-on impacts are part of the ‘domino effect’ whereby there are social effects after the initial damage by the flood. These social effects are also indicated by the amount of time it took some residents to move back into their house after the January 2003 flood. “Six months to three years people were out of their house!” and one said “next door have only just come back”. A few new houses in the area are now being built raised up with flood channels running through the bottom of the house; “a direct result of the January 2003 floods” suggests one resident, which seems a more recent method for allowing more people to live on floodplains.

            Many residents made it clear that they do understand the risks of living on a floodplain, and do accept there will be some unavoidable flooding. As long as the EA “just say it as it is!” residents will feel less negatively about the EA. Community support groups are in place to continuously inform people and to keep the pressure on the EA.

Overall Discussion

            Overall, the results indicate that there has been contact between residents and the EA both before and after flooding in January 2003. Residents are not impressed with efforts by the EA to take into consideration their views on flood alleviation policy, nor their attempts to explain the reasoning behind flooding in the area. The residents suggest it is the EA and their Jubilee River that was at fault for the January 2003 floods, despite evidence to show the EA have gone to extensive measures to alleviate flooding in the surrounding areas and take into account downstream effects. Residents feel the lack of comprehensive explanation for flood causes, plus little evidence of future improvements, means effected residents are fearful of future floods. Temporary measures and general improvements such as dredging is what residents want to happen. There are also concerns over house prices and insurance costs that this project has only touched upon. Further study of the impact a flood has on these factors could be possibility for further investigation. Similarly, a focus on public policy as a whole may give insights into policy management as well as understanding the politics and social contexts that may be behind any policy decision. These ideas taken into consideration together could produce greater understanding of flood alleviation policy, flooded residents impact and views, as well as general insights into relationships between policy makers and the public.

Conclusion

Flood alleviation policy has always been scrutinised by various parties involved, notably the residents that are at risk from flooding. This project has highlighted several trends in the views of flooded residents. In the case of Datchet and Wraysbury, research has shown residents have distinct views about flood policy, alleviation measures and the flooding itself.

            When designing a flood alleviation policy, all aspects must be considered to provide as good a policy as possible (Fordham, 2000). It is essential to have the correct engineering and technology, but similarly, communication with residents is also paramount to successful policy. In this case, the public involvement during the 1992 enquiry allowed residents to indicate their feelings towards the scheme. Some organisations did express concerns about downstream flooding, but this was dismissed by the EA and in turn agreed upon by the relative boroughs and councils. However, flooding did occur downstream which has led residents to believe that the EA and the Jubilee River were responsible for flooding; not by heavy rainfall as the EA suggest. However, there can be little doubt that over many years the EA (and its predecessors) have gone into great detail to plan a suitable alleviation system, which was explained to relevant organisations in the public enquiry, and was accepted as the correct option by the majority. The residents do still blame the EA, but it is important to take into consideration the position these residents are in. They have been impacted by flooding, they have had to experience the costs, and therefore it is only natural they feel someone is responsible. Without independent enquiry, it may never be clear what the real reasons for the flooding in January 2003 were. However, it has highlighted that rifts do exist between residents and the policy makers. In order to create an improved relationship between the two, the EA need to implement a ‘move-on strategy’: leave debates about past flooding behind, look to improving future flood measures and highlight to residents the benefits they will hope to bring. Policy makers need to understand that a few houses flooded against many saved may not been seen as something to their detriment. However, for the residents impacted there is much to lose, both physically and mentally. Residents that have experienced recent flooding do worry about future events occurring, and policy makers need to attempt to minimize these fears by indicating how things will be improved as soon as possible after residents have experienced flooding. This ‘post flood response’ may improve resident - policy maker relations, as well as reducing the risk of future flooding.

            Whether or not the EA are at fault for the January 2003 floods, there are major concerns from residents over the lack of dredging that occurs on the River Thames. Simple flood defence knowledge is enough to understand the basics behind dredging, whereby material from the bottom of the channel is removed. This allows more water to be retained in the river channel. It seems strange that the EA has not dredged to the extent its predecessor the National Rivers Authority did. Residents are concerned about this as potentially dredging could be the difference between being flooded minimally or severely. It is important that policy makers do not ignore ‘soft’ flood alleviation approaches, even if ‘hard’ approaches have been implemented. Penning-Rowsell et al (2006) agree that there is a movement ‘towards a greater reliance on a location specific mix of non-structural and people-centred flood mitigation actions, and a lessening of the influence of traditional engineering approaches’.

            In the case of the Jubilee River, residents suggested there had been a degree of mis-operation contributing to the flooding. Policy makers must ensure that when a sound flood defence has been implemented, the operation of it needs to be equally sound. Despite the uncertainty behind the reasons for flooding in January 2003, it reminds policy makers of the importance of correct operation of flood defence, as there is potential for flooding to occur as a result of mis-management.

Policy makers such as the EA are attempting to provide protection for residents who in the majority of cases expect complete protection. This presents a problem initially with respect to what residents expect, and what policy makers aim to do is distinctly different: policy makers accept there may be nothing they can do in a worst case scenario, but many residents may be expecting protection from such cases (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). It is important that policy makers clearly converse to residents exactly what they are aiming to do, and exactly who will benefit and who (if anyone) will be disadvantaged. However, the exact impacts generally are unknown and surrounded with considerable uncertainties. These uncertainties stem from natural randomness, uncertainty in data, models and parameters, and uncertainty about measures and scenarios. It may therefore be difficult to make a selection of measures relevant for a particular water management problem (Kort and Booij). In such cases, residents need to be told of the benefits, but also potential problems.

Similarly, many residents in this research showed knowledge of flooding in their area, as well as an understanding of the risks involved in living on a floodplain. Policy makers need to realise many residents have the potential of understanding flooding data, and a ‘smoke and mirrors’ policy hiding the facts is not appropriate. If anything, evidence here suggests residents feel something is being hidden, and this may have increased blame towards the EA. Policy makers may find honesty is best, even if they admit some fault, residents would be accepting of this if immediate plans were in place rectify the problems.

The idea of oral history has proved effective in enabling the values and concerns of local community to be expressed to policy makers, increasing their understanding of the area (Kapoor, 2001; Shindler and Cheek, 1999). In the case of Datchet and Wraysbury, this may have created a better relationship between residents and policy makers. It is something managers of future project need to considered.

            To summarise the findings of this project, the table below (Figure 7) shows a suggestion of recommendations for policy makers as well as residents- as some responsibility, even if a small amount, must lie with residents:

Figure 7:

The aim of these ideas is not to guarantee successful policy, or to insinuate that these ideas have not previously been taken into account. It is simply to illustrate ways of improving the relationship between residents and policy makers through improved policy and greater understanding.

There are still issues for residents and policy makers in the areas of Datchet and Wraysbury, and currently there are plans for future flood channel systems. It remains to be seen if residents’ fears are alleviated in the future, and if so how this is achieved. There is no doubt flooded residents are in a position where they experience loss, and it is essential policy makers take this into account after flooding events have arisen. It seems likely there will always be a strained relationship between flooded residents and policy makers, and these issues are likely to be space-time specific. However, this research has given insights into residents’ views and potential ways their relationship with policy makers can be improved. Through location and situation specific adaptation, policy makers can use some of these ideas to improve the relationship they have with flooded residents. Whether this can be done through flood alleviation or post-flood response, there inarguably needs to be improved attempts to alleviate flooded residents fears and take into account their views.

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